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Trends in Global Emissions: Carbon, Sulfur, 
and Nitrogen 
ARNULF GRUBLER 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (llASA), Laxenburg, Austria 
Global anthropogenic emissions of carbon, sulfur and nitrogen are reviewed by major category. Both present 
and historical emissions are reviewed including respective uncertainty ranges. The article concludes with a 
brief discussion of how to relate trends in emissions to the evolution of their underlying driving forces using 
energy-related carbon emissions as an example. 
Main conclusions for the three gases are summarized below: 
Anthropogenic emissions of carbon are small compared to the sizes of natural carbon reservoirs and the 
annual flow rates between them. Yet they constitute important perturbations of the natural carbon cycle, well 
quantified for industrial carbon emissions (mostly the burning of fossil fuels), but remaining uncertain for carbon 
emissions arising from biomass burning and land-use changes. Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, some 
530 billion tons of carbon (Pg C) gross emissions have been released by human activities to the atmosphere, 
part of which was balanced by (highly uncertain) terrestrial biospheric carbon sinks. Net carbon emissions 
over the period 1800-2000 are estimated at 280 Pg C. After accounting for oceanic uptake, these emissions 
have increased the atmospheric carbon loading by 200 Pg C, or by one-third natural levels. In the absence 
of stringent climate policies, between 770 and 2540 Pg C could be released to the atmosphere over the next 
JOO years. A significant amplification of humankind's "discernible influence on the climate system" is thus 
likely. 
Anthropogenic emissions of sulfur have surpassed natural flows ever since the first quarter of the 20th century. 
Since about 1975 global emissions (mostly from burning of sulfur-rich fossil fuels such as coal and oil) have 
stayed roughly constant. A continued rise in sulfur emissions in developing countries has been compensated by 
drastic declines in emissions in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
as a result of environmental policies. Similar policies will be required also in developing countries to counter 
local and regional environmental impacts of high sulfur emissions. A slowdown and ultimately a trend reversal 
of sulfur emission growth trends also in developing countries could thus be likely over the next few decades. 
Emissions of nitrogen take a variety of forms and originate from a wide array of different sources including: 
nitrogen oxides, principally formed in high temperature combustion (burning of fossil fuels); ammonia, prin-
cipally arising from animal manure; and nitrous oxide (N2 0), a powerful greenhouse gas, principally arising 
from soil microbiological process as well as agricultural activities and animal manure. Because of the multi-
tude of gases and sources, emission estimates are poorly understood and uncertain. There is also a paucity of 
both past and present inventory data and future emission scenarios. More research is therefore needed before 
considering policy interventions to control these gases beyond well established source categories (e.g., nitrogen 
oxide emissions from automobiles, or nitrous oxide emissions from adipic acid production). 
CARBON 
Anthropogenic em1ss1ons of carbon arise predominantly 
from the combustion of fossil fuels , the burning of 
biomass, as well as oxidation of soil carbon following 
land-use changes (e.g., deforestation). These anthropogenic 
emissions are embedded in large fluxes between the (yet 
larger) carbon reservoirs (atmosphere, oceans, vegetation 
and soils, as well as deposits of fossil fuels) that 
characterize the carbon cycle (Houghton and Skole, 1990; 
Schimmel et al., 1995, see Carbon Cycle, Volume 2). Due 
to the magnitude of the reservoirs and the annual exchange 
rates between them, that are known only approximately, 
human alterations to the carbon cycle are comparatively 
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small , are difficult to quantify and are hence subject to 
considerable uncertainties, especially for land-use change 
carbon emissions. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
summarizes current knowledge on the size of the respec-
tive carbon reservoirs and fluxes for the 1980s as fol-
lows (Schimmel et al., 1995; Nakicenovic et al., 1996): 
the largest carbon reservoirs are the oceans (close to 
40000PgC [PgC = Petagrams (1015 g) elemental carbon, 
1 Pg = I Gt (gigatons, or one billion metric tons), I Pg = 
I 000 Tg (teragrams, or 1012 g)]), deposits of fossil fuels 
(coal , conventional and unconventional oil and gas (such 
as inter alia oil shales, tar sands, gas in tight formations , 
in aquifers, and coal seams), including methane hydrates: 
25 000 Pg C), vegetation and soils (2200 Pg C), and finally 
the atmosphere (750 Pg C). Only the latter carbon reservoir 
size is directly measurable, and the increasing atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentrations are proof that human activi-
ties and resulting emissions are indeed altering the carbon 
cycle, the composition of the atmosphere, and hence the 
radiative (heat) balance of the planet (global warming). The 
global carbon cycle involves the annual exchange of some 
90 Pg C between the atmosphere and the oceans, and some 
60 Pg C between the biosphere (vegetation and soils) and 
the atmosphere. The inter-annual variations of measured 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (5.4 parts per 
million by volume (ppmv) in 1998 at Mauna Loa, Hawaii 
(Keeling and Whorf, 1999)) clearly indicate the importance 
of seasonal vegetation cycles in biospheric carbon fluxes. 
The inter-annual variation of 5.4 ppmv corresponds to some 
11 Pg C. Compared to the size of annual fluxes that char-
acterize the carbon cycle and its inter-annual variations, 
anthropogenic alterations to the carbon cycle are compar-
atively small and hence impossible to measure directly. 
Emission estimates need therefore to be based on inventory 
data linking socio-economic activity data such as fossil fuel 
use or land use changes, with specific emission factors in 
the case of fossil fuel emissions, or micro- and mesa-scale 
models of how soil and vegetation carbon reservoirs, and 
the exchange rates between them, are affected by human 
activities. 
Currently (AD 2000), human-induced alterations to car-
bon flows include emissions of some 6.6(±0.6) Pg C year- 1 
from industrial activities (mostly the burning of fossil fuels) 
that constitute a net addition to natural carbon fluxes, albeit 
not necessarily in the same year. In addition, estimates 
indicate a net additional flux of about one (uncertainty 
range: 0-2.8) Pg C year- 1 from the burning of biomass and 
changes in soil carbon in conjunction with land use changes. 
This estimated net biospheric flux is the difference between 
estimates of a variety of carbon sources and sinks (see dis-
cussion below) and is affected by high uncertainty margins. 
This is illustrated in the following simplified representation 
of the global annual carbon balance in Pg C for the 1980s 
(Schimmel et al., 1995; Houghton, 1999). 
atmospheric increase = industrial emissions 
+ net land-use emissions - ocean uptake 
- residual (missing sink) 
3.3(±0.2) = 5.5(±0.5) + 1.1(0 - 2.8) - 2.0(±0.8) 
- 1.3(0 - 3.3) 
Table I summarizes the main, contemporary anthropogenic 
industrial and biotic carbon emission sources as well as 
associated uncertainty ranges. The numbers exclude carbon 
dioxide fluxes arising from the metabolism of human and 
animal populations for which inventory data are lacking. 
Industrial sources of carbon emissions are comparatively 
well understood and quantified. The dominant source is fos-
sil energy production, conversion, and use, i.e., burning of 
fossil fuels (6 Pg C). Secondary sources are the manufac-
ture of cement (0.2 Pg C) and the flaring of natural gas 
(0.06 Pg C) which occurs when gas is produced together 
with crude oil, but due to the absence of local markets 
or infrastructures cannot be used as a fuel and is flared 
(burned) instead. Re-injection into the oil reservoir for 
repressuring avoids the need for flaring and is practiced 
in many oil fields (CEDIGAZ, 1998). Yet even the mod-
est costs involved seem not to justify the preservation of 
natural gas resources for future uses in many locations. 
Hence flaring continues (albeit declining). Globally some 
120 billion m3 of natural gas are flared, about equal to the 
global trade in LNG (liquefied natural gas) or the natu-
ral gas consumption of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and 
Belgium combined (CEDIGAZ, 1998). Minor carbon emis-
sion sources include the manufacture of lime and ammonia 
(Harvey, 1999), the release of carbon dioxide from car-
bon dioxide rich fossil fuel reservoirs, and the production 
of carbon dioxide from natural reservoirs for tertiary oil 
recovery and for the food (beverage) industry. Even if small 
when compared to natural carbon fluxes, carbon emissions 
are the largest material flow of the industrial metabolism. 
The 6 Pg C of industrial carbon emissions compares, for 
instance, to an annual production volume of 2.5 Pg for the 
seven most important industrial commodities (in decreas-
ing order of tonnage: cement, steel, paper, fertilizers, glass, 
aluminum, copper, cf. Griibler, I 998a). 
Emission estimates for industrial sources are quite accu-
rate (±10%). As energy is a preferred target for taxation, 
production, trade, and stock statistics are fairly accurate, at 
least for commercially traded energy forms such as fos-
sil fuels. (Uncertainties for non-commercial energy use 
such as the traditional biomass fuels used in developing 
countries are however substantial (see Biomass Burning 
in Rural Homes in Tropical Areas, Volume 3).) The 
net balance between production, trade flows and stock 
changes allows one to determine annual apparent fossil 
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Table 1 Global carbon emissions as estimated for 1990 per major source category and 
uncertainty ranges (in Tg C year- 1 )• 
Net Gross Uncertainty range 
Coal 2424 
Oil (fuels) 2285 
Oil (feedstocks) 324 
Gas 1135 
Cement 157 
Gas flaring 60 
Industrial 6061 6385 5800-7000 
Fuelwoodb 530 
Traditional biofuelsb 630 
Biofuelsb 1160 ??-1600 
Savannah fires 0 1660 
Other biomass ??-1700 
Tropical forestsd 1100 
Temperate forestsd 0 
Land-use changeb 1100 0-2800e 
Total 6061 8645 5800- > 13 1 00 
a Emission categories that are not balanced by (uncertain) biospheric carbon sinks or that are not 
released to the atmosphere in the same year are listed as gross emissions, all others as net emissions 
(see text). For land-use change related emissions, the net biospheric flux as estimated by IPCC ( 1995) 
for the 1980s (the latest period for which global estimates are available) and the uncertainty range 
as estimated by Houghton (1999) for the same period are given. (Data source: see text.) 
b Emissions of biofuels and land-use change not necessarily entirely additive. 
c Andreae (1991). Not included in total gross emissions. 
d Estimated net biospheric flows (IPCC, 1995). 
e Upper range for net biospheric flux due to land-use change (Houghton, 1999). no estimates of gross 
emissions available. 
fuel consumption, and that combined with carbon emission 
factors makes quantification of corresponding carbon emis-
sions rather straightforward. Emission estimates are made 
regularly from the energy statistics of the United Nations 
(Marland et al., 1999), the International Energy Agency 
(IEA, 1998), or the statistics published by British Petroleum 
(BP, 1999, see Table 1) drawing on similar methodolo-
gies (for the IPCC/IEA guidelines, see Houghton et al., 
1996). Aggregate results yield comparable global numbers, 
albeit differences (i.e., uncertainties) remain in the partition 
between various fuel types and between regions as a result 
of statistical differences and uncertainties in the heat content 
of different fuels, especially for coal. As an approximation, 
carbon emission factors are practically constant per unit 
energy content for different qualities of fuel wood, coal, oil, 
and gas, respectively, reflecting their molecular composition 
(ratio of hydrogen to carbon atoms). Characteristic emission 
factors (based on lower heating values) are 29.9 kg C 01- 1 
for fuel wood (and other biomass fuels), 25.8 kg C 01- 1 
for coal, 20kgCGJ- 1 for oil, and 15.3kgC01-1 for gas 
(Nakicenovic et al., 1996). Hence, uncertainties in heat val-
ues of different fuel qualities translate into proportional 
uncertainties of carbon emissions. Emission estimates for 
non-energy uses of fossil fuels (feedstocks) are affected by 
larger uncertainties, as the carbon contained in feedstock 
fuel (mostly oil) ends up in a wide variety of products 
(plastics, asphalt, bitumen, lubricants) which are in many 
instances long lived. Several decades may therefore pass 
before the carbon contained in these products is ultimately 
oxidized (e.g., when these products are burned) and released 
to the atmosphere. Hence, for any given year, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between gross and net emissions. Gross 
emissions result from the transfer of carbon between var-
ious reservoirs due to human activity such as converting 
crude oil extracted from an oilfield where it has remained 
for geological ages to combustible fuel (e.g., gasoline) or 
long-lived materials (e.g., plastics, asphalt). Net emissions 
of any given year are those that result from human activities 
in that year, e.g., burning of gasoline in an internal com-
bustion engine car. For fossil fuel, the differences between 
gross and net emissions are comparatively minor: some 
0.3 Pg C, or 5%. Yet the difference is of similar importance 
as the secondary industrial sources i.e., cement manufacture 
and gas flaring. 
Another source of uncertainty relates to biomass fuels. 
When produced at sustainable rates, sources and sinks will 
balance, albeit not necessarily in a given year. Whenever, 
biomass regrowth falls short of the rate of biomass burn-
ing, sources exceed sinks, giving rise to net emissions. 
Historically, this was the case for industrialized coun-
tries. Recently, biotic sinks have exceeded biotic emissions 
in the Northern Hemisphere, justifying the classification 
of biofuels as carbon neutral. The current situation in 
many developing countries is far removed from this carbon 
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benign state of affairs, resembling that in the industrialized 
countries some decades to a few centuries ago, character-
ized by deforestation and unsustainable biomass fuel use. 
The historian of pre-industrial Europe Carlo Cipolla (1981) 
characterizes medieval European forestry use as "eminently 
parasitic and extremely wasteful". Biomass fuels are there-
fore included in the biotic carbon sources given in Table 1 
as they usually are accounted for in detailed land-use 
change carbon inventories (Houghton, 1999). Note how-
ever, that the values given for gross emissions of biomass 
burning (e.g., fuelwood) and those from land-use changes 
are not necessarily additive because fuelwood gathering in 
connection with deforestation is usually also accounted for 
in the respective land-use change related carbon fluxes . 
Thus, part (perhaps up to 0.5 Pg C) of the 1.2 Pg C gross 
emissions due to biofuel burning may already be included 
in the I. I Pg C gross emissions due to land-use changes 
reported in Table 1. This uncertainty and the risk of possible 
double counting has led to the doubtful practice of generally 
ignoring biofuel related carbon emissions in energy studies 
and emission inventories. 
Differences between gross and net emissions as well 
as uncertainties are especially pronounced in the case of 
biotic carbon emissions. In that case, gross emissions, 
e.g., from biomass burning, need to be balanced with 
corresponding sinks, i.e., the uptake of carbon dioxide by 
vegetation in order to determine net emissions. In addition, 
both sources and sinks operate frequently on different 
time scales (burning a wood log takes an hour, growth 
of a tree many decades) . To complicate things further, 
changes in vegetation cover also involve changes in soil 
carbon. The response rates of top and deep soil layers to 
a change in vegetation cover (e.g., conversion of forests 
to agricultural fields) are poorly understood and involve 
time scales of many decades (Houghton and Skole, 1990; 
Houghton, 1999). 
Consider the burning of agricultural residues either in 
the field or as energy for rural households: emissions from 
biomass grown on an annual rotational cycle are balanced 
by corresponding vegetation regrowth (carbon uptake) in 
the following or preceding growing season. A similar case 
is that of savannah fires (natural or induced by human 
activities) . Combined, these two categories involve the 
annual burning of some 5.7 billion tons dry matter per 
year and an estimated release of 1.6 Pg C (Andrae, 1991, 
see Table 1 ). As sources and sinks are assumed to balance 
over a time scale of approximately a year, these emission 
categories are generally excluded from carbon inventories 
(and are also not shown in the Figures below, not the least 
because historical estimates are unavailable. An exception 
is biomass fuel outside fuelwood, for which a conservative 
estimate is included in the data presented here (based on 
interpolated values given in UN, 1952; Putnam, 1954; 
Nakicenovic et al., 1998. As simplification, the carbon 
emission factor for these other traditional biofuels like 
agricultural residues, dried animal dung, etc., is assumed 
to be the same as fuelwood). 
For a complicated case consider the case of forest clear-
ing: Felling of trees may entail short-term carbon emissions 
when wood is used as fuel, and a significantly delayed 
response when used as construction material (when a wood 
structure eventually burns down). In most cases, the dom-
inant source of carbon emission is the decay of woody 
material after forest clearing (Houghton et al., 2000). Car-
bon releases from soils depend critically on the ensuing land 
uses: secondary forest regrowth, or conversion to intensive 
agriculture. Soil carbon release rates depend therefore on 
(changing) land uses that follow deforestation and involve 
a time scale of many decades. Estimating corresponding 
carbon fluxes is thus a formidable challenge. 
Large uncertainties thus prevail for biospheric carbon 
sources and sinks. Assuming high biospheric (gross) emis-
sions implies assuming a large biospheric sink (frequently 
assumed to be located in northern latitudes, cf. Schim-
mel et al., 1995) in order to balance the global car-
bon cycle. Low biospheric emission fluxes, especially 
when combined with upper range estimates of oceanic 
uptake rates, reduce the size of the residual (missing) sink 
required to balance the global carbon cycle. The average 
value of 1.1 Pg C year- 1 net biospheric carbon emissions 
for the 1980s suggested in the IPCC review (Schimmel 
et al., 1995) is derived from adopting a mean value of 
1.6(± 1) Pg C from tropical latitudes balanced against an 
estimated uptake rate of 0.5(±0.5) Pg C year- 1 for northern 
latitudes. The estimated net biospheric flow of 1.1 Pg C rep-
resents a top down estimate, based on balancing the global 
carbon cycle as well as on carbon cycle model calculations. 
These models are frequently initialized with a 1980s global 
biospheric flux of 1.1 Pg C when reproducing the historical 
record of carbon dioxide concentration changes or when 
calculating future scenarios (for an overview see Houghton 
et al., 1997; for a representative model see e.g., Wigley 
et al., 1994). 
Conversely, bottom-up assessments based on detailed 
inventory models, that yield changes in vegetation and 
soil carbon in response to land-use changes, typically 
yield higher estimates of net biospheric carbon flows: 
2(±0.8) Pg C year- 1 for the 1980s, including 1.9(±0.6) Pg C 
in the tropics and 0.1 (±0.5) Pg C in temperate latitudes 
(Houghton, 1999). Available (uncertain) forest inventory 
data indicate an average rate of tropical forest clearing of 
some 13 .3 million ha year- 1 for the 1980s, and an average 
12.6millionhayear-1 for the period 1990-1995, compared 
to an average afforestation rate of 1.3 million ha year- 1 in 
non-tropical regions for the period 1990-1995 (FAO, 1997; 
WRI, 1998). Translating these land-use change numbers 
into estimates of gross biospheric emissions and balancing 
those against sinks to determine estimates of net emissions 
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is highly problematic because of uncertainties in secondary 
forest regrowth, soil carbon, as well as the magnitude of 
the (undisturbed) forest carbon sink. Recent estimates for 
the Brazilian Amazon, characterized by high rates of for-
est clearing and regrowth (see Deforestation and Habitat 
Fragmentation in the Amazon Basin, Volume 3), conver-
sion to agricultural uses followed by later abandonment, 
and wood logging, indicate nonetheless a roughly balanced 
carbon budget between emissions due to land-use changes 
and carbon uptake by vegetation regrowth and by natural 
ecosystems in the region (Houghton et al., 2000). However, 
considerable variations exist between individual years: the 
Brazilian Amazon is estimated to have been either a (net) 
source or sink of about 0.2 Pg C for different individual 
years over the period 1989-1998. 
Whereas bottom-up assessments thus continue to be 
the best way for estimating current and historical gross 
biotic carbon emissions, it is not possible yet to accurately 
determine net biospheric carbon emissions. This is why no 
estimates of respective current net emissions are given in 
Table I. Also in the figures of historical emissions given 
below, respective biospheric carbon emissions are reported 
as gross values only. 
From a combination of direct atmospheric measurements 
and analyses of air samples trapped in glacier ice, there 
is compelling evidence that atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations have increased from some 280 ppmv (Nef-
tel et al., 1985; Schimmel et al., 1995) in pre-industrial 
times to some 370 ppmv (estimate for AD 2000): i.e., an 
increase in the atmospheric carbon reservoir of close to 
200 Pg C over the last 200 years. How can this increase in 
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atmospheric concentration be allocated to different carbon 
emission categories? 
Historical emission inventories for fossil fuel use and 
other industrial sources have a long scientific history 
starting from the pioneering contributions of Putnam (1954) 
and Keeling (1973). For land-use related emissions, the 
main historical data sources are the estimates of Houghton 
and Skole (1990) and Houghton (1999). A combined histor-
ical inventory of industrial and biotic carbon emissions was 
developed by Griibler and Nakicenovic (1994), an update 
of which is summarized in Figures 1 and 2. The original 
inventory spanned the period 1800-1988. Updates for fos-
sil fuels , cement and gas flaring to 1998 are based on BP 
(1999) (and earlier vols.), CEDIGAZ (1998); and Marland 
et al. (1999). Values for the year 2000 are estimates based 
on extrapolation of short-term (1995-1998) trends. For 
biotic emissions, a comparable value as estimated by the 
IPCC (Schimmel et al., 1995) for the 1980s, i.e., average 
annual net biotic emissions of 1 Pg C, was assumed for 
the 1990s, based on FAQ (1998) forest inventory data that 
indicate similar average deforestation rates in the two time 
periods. 
Figure 1 presents an overview of historical carbon emis-
sions by source since 1800. Figure 2 adds these emissions 
categories, presenting them as cumulative totals. Only emis-
sions from burning of fossil fuels and from the manufacture 
of cement can be classified clearly as net contributions 
to the atmosphere. As discussed above, the fraction of 
gross emissions that is not absorbed by sinks, or that may 
be released over long time periods (feedstocks) is highly 
uncertain. Hence these emission categories are shown as 
1925 1950 1975 2000 
Figure 1 Annual carbon emissions per major source category 1850-2000 (in Tg C year-1 ). Emission categories that are 
not balanced by (uncertain) biospheric carbon sinks or that are not released to the atmosphere in the same year are 
shown as gross emissions (dashed lines). all others as net emissions (solid lines). Values for the year 2000 are preliminary 
estimates. (Reproduced from Grubler and Nakicenovic, 1994 and Grubler, 1998a [Updated (see text))) 
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Figure 2 Annual carbon emissions per major source category 1800-2000, cumulative totals (in Tg C year- 1 ). (Reproduced 
from Figure 1) 
gross em1ss10ns only in Figure 2. Cumulatively over the 
period 1800-2000, net carbon emissions total (a minimum) 
of some 280 Pg C, whereas gross carbon emissions total (a 
maximum) of 530 Pg C. In explaining the growth of atmo-
spheric carbon, net emissions need to be balanced against 
the magnitude of the oceanic carbon sink, whereas gross 
emissions need to be balanced against the size of both the 
oceanic and the terrestrial carbon sinks. 
In order of decreasing importance in terms of cumulative 
emissions since 1800 (derived from Figures 1 and 2), burn-
ing of coal and emissions due to land use changes are the 
two most important emission categories (148 Pg C net for 
coal and 155 Pg C gross for land-use changes). Houghton 
(1999) estimates for the period 1850-1990 that land-use 
changes (including fuelwood burning and logging) released 
a total of 373 Pg C to be balanced against an estimated ter-
restrial sink uptake of 249 Pg C (211 Pg C carbon uptake by 
vegetation regrowth and 38 Pg C soil carbon recovery). This 
yields an estimated net biospheric carbon flux of 124 Pg C, 
a comparable magnitude to the 155 Pg C gross carbon emis-
sions due to land-use changes (excluding fuelwood burning) 
estimated here for the period 1800-2000. Oil ranks third 
(91 Pg C net emissions or 103 Pg C when non-energy feed-
stock uses ( 12 Pg C), classified here as gross emissions, are 
added). Burning of fuelwood and other (traditional) biomass 
fuels for energy purposes is estimated to have released some 
77 Pg C (gross) emissions, albeit this quantity is not nec-
essarily entirely additive to the emissions estimated from 
land-use changes. Burning natural gas as fuel is estimated 
to have released some 38 Pg C (net) since 1800 (most of 
it since 1950), whereas the manufacture of cement and the 
flaring (waste) of natural gas yields a comparatively small 
number of 5 Pg C (net) emissions since 1800. 
Thus, the historic atmospheric increase of some 200 Pg C 
balances against a range of between 280 and 530 Pg C 
(net/gross) carbon emissions from all sources and an 
inferred cumulative uptake by all carbon sinks (oceanic 
and terrestrial) of between 80 and 330 Pg C over the period 
1800-2000. 
Most of the historical human-induced perturbations of the 
global carbon cycle originate from emissions in the industri-
alized countries. From the estimated cumulative net carbon 
emissions since 1800 (some 280 Pg C), about three-quarters 
originate from the industrialized countries, and one quarter 
from developing countries. For gross emissions, the dif-
ference is less pronounced: about 55% originate from the 
industrialized countries versus 45% from developing coun-
tries. Yet, such comparisons of historical emissions ignore 
important regional disparities in emission drivers such as 
population, levels of affluence, and levels and efficiency of 
technologies employed. When making these comparisons, 
it must be remembered that since 1800 70% of the world's 
people have lived in the developing countries (Griibler and 
Nakicenovic, 1994). Therefore when measured on a per 
capita basis the share of developing countries in histori-
cal or current emissions is much smaller than the simple 
numbers above would suggest (for detailed calculations see 
Fujii, 1990; Griibler and Fujii, 1991). 
The division of annual gross and net emissions since 
1800 for three macroregions is illustrated in Figure 3. 
The definition of these three macroregions follows that 
of the original UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC, 1992). It comprises: the countries of 
the OECD as of 1990 (Annex II in United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)); the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as of the 
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Figure 3 Annual carbon emissions per major emitting regions and given as cumulative totals (in Tg C year-1 ). The 
regions are as defined in the 1990 UNFCC (see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto 
Protocol, Volume 4): OECD countries as of 1990 (OECD, UNFCCC Annex II countries), countries undergoing economic 
reform (REF, UNFCCC Annex I countries outside Annex II}, and developing countries (DEV, UNFCCC non-Annex I 
countries}. OECD and REF combined represent the industrialized countries referred to in the UN FCC as Annex I countries 
(IND in Table 3) . Respective totals for gross and net carbon emissions (all sources} are shown as dashed and solid lines 
respectively (see text} . (Reproduced from Grubler and Nakicenovic, 1994 [updated (see text)]} 
former Soviet Union undergoing economic reform (Annex I 
outside Annex II in UNFCC); as well as developing 
countries (non-Annex I countries in UNFCCC). Combined 
OECD and economic reform countries constitute the indus-
trialized countries (IND in Figure 3) as defined by Annex 
I of the 1992 UNFCCC (see United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol, Vol-
ume 4). 
It is important to note that differences between gross 
and net emissions for different regions change over time. 
For instance, whereas this difference is substantial for 
the industrialized countries throughout the 19th century 
and also up to approximately 1950, the difference gets 
smaller, gradually disappearing after the 1970s. In other 
words, biotic carbon emissions such as land-use changes 
and fuelwood use (the main source for the difference 
between gross and net emissions shown in Figure 3), while 
being important in the early history of industrialization, 
are no longer important in the industrialized countries. 
There, the dominant emission source at present is the 
burning of fossil fuels. Currently, biotic carbon emissions 
in industrialized countries are close to zero. Historically, 
they account for about one quarter of cumulative carbon 
emissions of the industrialized countries since 1800. For 
developing countries, the situation resembles that of the 
industrialized countries more than a century ago (when 
the industrial countries had similar (low) levels of per 
capita incomes as the developing countries have today): 
an important share of emissions comes from biotic sources, 
with fossil fuel shares increasing in importance over time. 
Industrial emission sources account for around 40% of 
cumulative emissions of developing countries since 1800; 
by the year 2000 they already account for two thirds of 
carbon emissions from developing countries. 
A brief discussion of how to relate the historical trends in 
emissions discussed above to main driving forces is given 
at the end of this contribution using energy-related carbon 
dioxide as example (see Carbon Dioxide Concentration 
and Climate Over Geological Times, Volume 1; Carbon 
Dioxide, Recent Atmospheric Trends, Volume 1; Carbon 
Cycle, Volume 2; Boreal Forest Carbon Flux and it's 
Role in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol Under 
a Warming Climate, Volume 4). 
Concerning future emission trends, the (vast) literature 
on this subject cannot be reviewed in detail here. A com-
prehensive, quantitative overview of the scenario literature 
is given by Nakicenovic et al. (2000), who also present the 
latest long-term emissions scenarios developed under the 
auspices of the IPCC. In this scenario set, representative 
of current understanding of the underlying uncertainties in 
demographic, economic and technological developments, 
global carbon emissions could range anywhere between 8 
and 27 Pg C by 2050 and between 3 and 37 Pg C by the end 
of this century. It is also instructive to look at projected 
levels of cumulative emissions, which are a (rough) first 
approximation of the possible magnitude of climate change. 
By 2100 cumulative carbon emissions could range between 
770 and 2540 Pg C, or between equal, to more than three 
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times the amount currently contained in the atmosphere. 
In the absence of vigorous climate change policy initia-
tives (the new IPCC scenarios were developed under the 
mandate of explicitly excluding additional climate poli-
cies) even the lowest scenarios suggest that more carbon 
will be released to the atmosphere over the next 100 years 
( > 770 Pg C) than has cumulatively been released since the 
onset of the Industrial Revolution (range of 230-530 Pg C 
net/gross emissions since 1800, respectively). A significant 
amplification of humankind's "discernible influence on the 
climate system" (IPCC, 1995) is thus likely. 
SULFUR 
Studies of the global sulfur cycle (good reviews are pro-
vided by Husar and Husar, 1990; and Smit, 1997) indicate 
that anthropogenic emissions of sulfur have surpassed nat-
ural flows ever since the first quarter of the 20th century. 
Dominant natural sources include the weathering of rocks 
and soil, volatile biogenic sulfur emissions from land and 
the oceans as well as volcanoes. Combined, natural sources 
are estimated to release between 40 and 60 Tg S (1 Tg S = 
one million (metric) tons elemental sulfur (MtS). To convert 
to S02, the customary unit of most sulfur studies, multiply 
by 2 (IPCC, 1995; Husar and Husar, 1990). This compares 
to total anthropogenic sulfur emissions of between 65 and 
90TgS in the early 1990s (Benkovitz et al., 1996; Olivier 
et al. , 1996; WMO, 1997). The dominant form of anthro-
pogenic sulfur emissions is airborne emissions of S02 with 
some smaller quantities of S03 (hence sulfur emissions are 
frequently referred to as SOx ). 
The ecological impacts of large anthropogenic sulfur 
emissions arise at three spatial and temporal scales. First, 
at the local level, high ambient concentrations of S02 have 
well documented (WHO and UNEP, 1993; WMO, 1997) 
impacts on human health, vegetation, and materials (cor-
rosion, "stone cancer" of historical sandstone buildings). 
Second, sulfur emissions are one of the main contributors 
to acidic deposition (acid rain) that affects ecosystems up 
to a continental scale (changes in pH of streams and lakes 
and resulting decline in fish populations, reductions in the 
vitality of the forest ecosystem. Forest dieback, or "Wald-
sterben" however is increasingly recognized as a multiple 
stress phenomenon that cannot be related simply to a single 
source of environmental stress such as acidic precipitation) 
(see Waldsterben, Volume 5). Typically, impacts accrue 
in a highly non-linear fashion (dependent on acidic deposi-
tion levels and the buffering capacity of soils) which have 
led to the formulation of critical loads of acidic depo-
sition (see e.g., Amann et al., 1995; Posch et al., 1996) 
(see Critical Load, Volume 3). Thirdly, sulfur emissions 
also assume global ecological significance; evidence is 
increasing that sulfate aerosols exert a pronounced cooling 
effect (counterbalancing greenhouse gas (GHG)-induced 
warming) in the Northern Hemisphere (IPCC, 1995). 
A detailed review of available sulfur emission inventories 
is given in Griibler (1998b), where available global sulfur 
emission inventories are also compared for the year 1990. 
The best-guess value suggested in that review is 76 Tg S 
global anthropogenic sulfur emissions for 1990. 
The dominant anthropogenic sources of sulfur emissions 
are (as for carbon emissions) the burning of fossil fuels. 
In the case of sulfur, emissions are dominated by burning 
of coal (some 53 Tg S in 1990, Lefohn et al., 1999) and 
to a smaller degree by oil products (12 Tg S). Natural gas 
is (with a few exceptions that do not assume any global 
significance) almost sulfur free (small traces of sulfur com-
pounds (H2S) are added deliberately as a safety measure; 
a smelly tracer helps to detect gas leakages) and hence not 
a significant source. The third largest emissions category 
is metallurgical processes (reduction of sulfide ores dur-
ing the smelting of copper, lead, and zinc), estimated at 
some 6 Tg S in 1990 (Lefohn et al., 1999). Smaller addi-
tional emissions sources are biomass burning (some 2 Tg S, 
cf. Pepper et al., 1992), as well as marine bunker fuels 
(usually high sulfur-containing heavy fuel oil which is gen-
erally not allowed to be burned on land) with some 3 Tg S 
in 1990 ( 4 Tg S in 1994, cf. Corbett et al., 1999). Finally, 
sulfur emissions from pulp and paper mills, although glob-
ally marginal, may have important local ecological effects 
(apart from their offensive smells). For the sake of com-
pleteness, it also should be mentioned that the elemental 
sulfur mined (some 25 Tg S, Smil, 1997) as feedstock for 
the chemical industry (mostly used in the production of 
sulfuric acid) generally does not result in airborne emis-
sions. This market however, is declining with the increasing 
availability of elemental sulfur recovered in oil refineries as 
a byproduct of fuel desulfurization to meet environmental 
standards (likewise gypsum mining faces increasing compe-
tition from gypsum produced from flue gas desulfurization 
units of coal-fired power stations). 
Sulfur emission inventories are developed on a regular 
basis in a number of regions, including within the EMEP 
and CORINAIR programs in Europe and the National 
Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) in North 
America. Recently more detailed emission inventories have 
become available for Asia, where emission growth rates are 
particularly high (Streets et al., 2000), including work in 
conjunction with the World Bank sulfur project (Foell et al., 
1995), and the detailed bottom up estimates of Akimoto 
and Narita (1994) and Kato (1996). Sulfur emissions in 
all regions not mentioned above (i.e., Pacific OECD coun-
tries like Australia and New Zealand, and all developing 
countries outside Asia) are much less well studied. Even if 
presently small when compared to those of Europe, North 
America and Asia, the sulfur emissions in these regions are 
likely to grow significantly in the longer-term. 
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Figure 4 Annual sulfur emissions per major emitting region as defined in Figure 3, 1800-2000, shown as cumulative 
totals (in Tg S year-1 ). Emissions from international marine bunker fuels that are usually not accounted for in 
national/regional emission inventories are shown separately. (Data sources: see text) 
At the global level, a number of spatially detailed sulfur 
emission inventories have been developed. Global, gridded 
(I x 1 degrees) sulfur emissions inventory data are needed 
for a variety of purposes, most notably for climate mod-
eling purposes. As a rule, the required cycle times for the 
development of such detailed inventories are rather long, 
implying that data can be quite outdated. With the exception 
of the EDGAR data base (Olivier et al., 1996) referring to 
1990, global gridded data sets available are quite outdated 
in view of rapidly changing regional sulfur emission trends. 
For instance, the Spiro et al. (1992) inventory refers to the 
year 1980; the Global Emissions Inventory Activity (GEIA) 
(Benkovitz et al., 1996) gridded sulfur emission data are an 
update of the Spiro et al., data set for 1985 for a number 
of regions, most of them OECD countries, but retain 1980 
values for many countries and regions. 
Contrary to carbon emissions, global and regional sulfur 
emission trends are much more dynamic, particularly since 
the early 1970s. As a result of sulfur abatement efforts, 
emissions in the OECD countries, particularly in Europe 
and Japan have declined drastically. Emissions in Central 
and Eastern Europe as well as the successor states of the 
former Soviet Union have also declined, especially in the 
wake of their economic restructuring. Conversely, with 
accelerated economic development, the growth of sulfur 
emissions in many part of Asia has been fast, albeit growth 
rates have declined recently (Streets et al., 2000). Thus 
sulfur emission trends must be analyzed regularly and with 
as recent data as possible. 
Historical sulfur emission inventories were first devel-
oped for Europe (cf. the formidable historical work of 
Mylona, 1993, 1996) as well as for the US (Gschwandner 
et al., 1985; EPA, 1995). Global estimates have been 
developed by Dignon and Hameed (1989); Stern and 
Kaufmann (1996) and Lefohn et al. (1999). A synthesis 
of these long-term sulfur emission trends is given in 
Figure 4. 
The long-term pattern of global sulfur emissions is char-
acterized by three phases: First until about the 1920s, sulfur 
emissions rose very rapidly (at an estimated average annual 
growth rate of some 4% year- 1) with the expanding use 
of coal, the fossil fuel richest in sulfur. In the period 
1925 to ca. 197 5, growth in global emissions continued, 
albeit at slower rates (some 2% year- 1 on average), as coal 
increasingly was replaced by oil, generally lower in sulfur 
content. Since around 1975, global emissions have stayed 
roughly constant. The continued rise of sulfur emissions in 
developing countries has been compensated by the drastic 
declines in emissions in the OECD countries (first Japan, 
then Europe and North America) as a result of environmen-
tal policies leading to fuel substitution, fuel desulfurization 
as well as stack gas cleaning (scrubbing). Emissions in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, as well as in the successor states of 
the former Soviet Union, have also declined drastically as 
a result of replacement of coal by other fuels, as well as the 
drastic economic recession since the early 1990s (the effects 
of environmental control measures like flue gas desulfur-
ization have been more limited to date). The industrialized 
countries accounted with some 50 Tg S for well over 80% 
of global sulfur emissions in 1975. By 2000, their sulfur 
emissions were down to some 25 Tg S (33% of global emis-
sions), whereas those of the developing countries (mostly 
in Asia) have risen to some 50 Tg S (around 67% of global 
emissions). 
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Figure 5 Extent of likely peak sulfur deposition levels: 1990 sulfur deposition in Europe (a) and projection for an 
(unabated) high-growth scenario for Asia in 2020 (b), in grams sulfur (S) m-2 • (Reproduced from Grubler, 1998a based 
on Amann et al., 1995) 
Recent estimates for Asia (Streets et al., 2000) indicate 
however, that also there, emission growth rates are declin-
ing as a result of the introduction of sulfur control legisla-
tion (Griibler, l 998b; IEA, 1999; Nakicenovic et al., 2000; 
Streets et al., 2000). An acceleration of these trends seems 
highly desirable in view of the projected large-scale impacts 
on human health, food production, as well as ecosystems 
of unabated growth in sulfur emissions in the densely pop-
ulated, coal intensive economies in Asia. A representative 
result of such projected scenarios (based on Amann et al., 
1995) is shown in Figure 5, which contrasts 1990 Euro-
pean sulfur deposition levels with those of Asia by 2050 
in a high (unabated) sulfur emission scenario. Typically, in 
such scenarios, sulfur emissions in Asia alone could surpass 
current global levels as early as 2020 (Amann et al., 1995; 
Posch et al., 1996). Sulfur deposition above 5 gm-2 year- 1 
occurred in Europe in 1990 in the area of the borders of the 
Czech Republic, Poland, and Germany (the former GDR); 
often referred to as the "black triangle". In view of its eco-
logical impacts, it was officially designated by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as an "ecologi-
cal disaster zone". In the scenario of high sulfur emission 
growth in Asia illustrated in Figure 5, similar high sulfur 
deposition would occur by around 2020 over more than half 
of Eastern China, large parts of southern Korea, and some 
smaller parts of Thailand and southern Japan. 
In order to avoid excessive damages, sulfur controls 
similar to those used previously in the OECD countries 
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are required, and indeed are already beginning to be 
implemented in a number of Asian countries. Doubtless, 
similar challenges will have to be faced by other developing 
countries outside Asia over the next two to three decades. 
The recent Jong-term scenario literature (reviewed in more 
detail in Griibler, l 998b; and Nakicenovic et al., 2000) 
indeed reflects such developments. Characteristic projected 
future global sulfur emission levels range between 20 and 
80TgS by 2050 and between 15 and 60TgS by 2100. The 
comparatively low levels of projected future sulfur emis-
sions reflects the assumed phase in of sulfur controls also 
outside the industrialized countries. 
Sulfur reduction policies aiming to protect local and 
regional populations and ecosystems have one interesting 
side effect: they lower the cooling effect caused by sul-
fate aerosols in the atmosphere, thus increasing the warm-
ing arising from future greenhouse gas emissions (Rogner 
and Nakicenovic, 1996; Subak et al., 1997) (see Aerosols, 
Effects on the Climate, Volume 1). 
NITROGEN 
Emissions of nitrogen compounds take many forms and 
originate from a wide array of different sources, natural and 
anthropogenic. Because of this diversity, individual source 
categories are studied in much less detail and therefore large 
uncertainties prevail. 
Nitrogen emissions occur in three principal molecular 
forms: as nitrogen oxides (NO and N02 that are subsumed 
generally as NOx ), principally formed in high temperature 
combustion (burning of fossil fuels, or natural lightning); as 
ammonia (NH3), principally arising from animal manure; 
and as nitrous oxide (N20), a powerful greenhouse gas, 
principally arising from soil microbiological process as well 
as agricultural activities and animal manure. Both NOx and 
NH3 are characterized by short atmospheric residence times 
and thus by only regional to continental dispersion from 
their respective emission sources. Their ecological signif-
icance arises principally in connection with acidification 
impacts (although NOx has also a significant influence on 
atmospheric chemistry, including ozone (03) destruction, 
and therefore is indirectly affecting GHG concentrations in 
the atmosphere). Nitrous oxide is a powerful, long-lived 
(120 years) greenhouse gas whose atmospheric concentra-
tions are estimated to have been 275 parts per billion by 
volume (ppbv) in pre-industrial times and have been mea-
sured at above 310 pbbv in the mid 1990s (IPCC, 1995). 
For ease of comparability, all emissions are expressed here 
in elemental weight of nitrogen per year (Tg N year- 1 ). 
NOx has long been of concern in the context of acidic 
deposition. In the last decade, however, the question of 
nitrogen over-fertilization of the biosphere has also been 
raised. 
See, for example, Munn et al. (l 999, 468). Possible 
long-term consequences include the creation of mineral 
deficiencies in forest soils due to leaching, and a general 
decrease in biodiversity, particularly in grasslands. Indeed, 
some ecologists are concerned that nitrogen overfertiliza-
tion constitutes a Jong-term threat to the whole boreal forest 
system. 
Until now, most research has focussed on emissions of 
nitrogen oxides (NOx, for a review see Smil, 1990), espe-
cially for energy-related emissions source categories since 
motorized traffic is one of the main sources of NOx emis-
sions and a major contributor to urban smog. Conversely 
other source categories, including natural processes have 
been much Jess studied and large uncertainties prevail. 
The first nitrogen inventory covering all three gases and 
all source categories at a regionally highly desegregated 
level has been developed by Olivier et al. (1998), based on 
earlier studies of Olivier et al. (1996), Lee et al. (1997); 
and Bouwman et al. (1997), and the discussion here draws 
heavily on this study. A summary of main emission cate-
gories is given in Table 2. 
Nitrogen emissions are dominated by anthropogenic 
sources: 77(37-113)TgN compared to 42(16-80)TgN 
natural sources. In terms of their contributions to total nitro-
gen emissions, NOx and NH3 dominate with 50(22-81) and 
54(23-88)TgN each, compared to 15(8-24)TgN in the 
case of nitrous oxide. For anthropogenic emissions, ammo-
nia ( 43(20-61 )Tg N) surpasses NOx (31 (16-46) Tg N), 
whereas nitrogen-wise, nitrous oxide is a comparatively 
small source of nitrogen (3(1-6)) (IPCC, 1995 indicates 
a slightly higher uncertainty range of 4-8 Tg N for nitrous 
oxide), cf. Olivier et al. (1998). 
For emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx ), the dominant 
anthropogenic source category is the burning of fossil fuels, 
most notably of automobile fuel and in the generation of 
electricity. NOx emission levels depend both on nitrogen 
content in fuels as well as on very diverse and variable 
operating and firing characteristics: NOx emissions tend 
to increase with increasing burning temperature. In this 
case, tradeoffs in improving environmental performance 
become apparent: improving efficiency of energy conver-
sion and lowering of carbon emissions, e.g., in an electric 
power plant, requires an increase in firing temperatures (the 
second Jaw of thermodynamics), which tends to increase 
NOx emissions. Reducing the latter requires catalytic reduc-
tion, which in tum involves an efficiency penalty, slightly 
increasing fuel use and hence carbon emissions. For cars 
de-NOx catalytic equipment also depends critically on oper-
ating temperature: at cold engine startup catalytic converters 
do not function . Therefore related emission estimates of this 
category of emissions are highly uncertain. Because of the 
dominance of industrialized countries in global car owner-
ship and electricity consumption, they account for over 75% 
of global NOx emissions from road transport and for 70% 
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Table 2 Global nitrogen emissions as estimates for 1990 per major source category and flux (NOx, NH3 , and N20) and 
uncertainty ranges (in Tg N year- 1 ) 
Anthropogenic 
Fossil fuel burning 
Industrial processes 
Agriculture: 
Animals 
Fertilizers 
Crops and waste 
Biomass burning 
Sewage 
Total 
Natural 
Soils 
Grasslands, wild animals, etc. 
Oceans 
Lightning 
Atmospheric processes 
Total 
Grand total 
Source: Olivier et al. (1998) . 
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Figure 6 World nitrogen fertilizer use by region (cumulative totals, in Tg N year-1). (Reproduced from Grubler, 1998a) 
of all NOx emissions from fossil fuel burning (Olivier et al., 
1998). Anthropogenic NOx emissions are also the only ones 
where estimates of long-term historical time series are avail-
able. For instance, the estimates of Dignon and Hameed 
(1989) indicate that global NOx emissions have increased 
by almost a factor five over the period 1930-1980. 
For ammonia (NH3) , the dominant source of anthro-
pogenic emissions is the agricultural sector, including emis-
sions from animal manure (22(10-30) Tg N) and applica-
tion of fertilizer (9(4-14) Tg N), that combined account for 
over 70% of NH3 emissions globally. The dominance of 
agricultural sources also explains that contrary to the case of 
NOx ammonia emissions predominantly originate in devel-
oping countries (a detailed discussion of NOx, NH3 and 
N20 emissions in India is given by Parashar et al., 1998), 
which accounted for approximately 70% of agricultural and 
total ammonia emissions in 1990. Rising animal popula-
tions, as well as rising fertilizer use and resulting ammonia 
(and nitrous oxide, see discussion below) emissions are the 
other side of the coin of vastly increased agricultural pro-
duction for ever rising populations (Figure 6). The increase 
to over 80 Tg N year- 1 would have been impossible without 
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the major technological breakthrough of the Haber-Bosch 
method of ammonia synthesis introduced in 1912. 
For emissions of nitrous oxides, the dominant anthro-
pogenic sources are again fertilizer applications and animal 
husbandry (manure) in the agricultural sector (2(0.3-4.3) 
Tg N year- 1 in 1990). The third largest source are indus-
trial processes (production of adipic and nitric acid) with 
0.3(0.l-0.5)TgN estimated for 1990 (Olivier et al., 1998), 
albeit these emissions are declining rapidly due to imple-
mentation of voluntary industry measures due to climate 
change concerns (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). Yet, even with 
drastic emission reductions, a long-term legacy of nitrous 
oxide emissions remains due to its long residence time 
in the atmosphere. As in the case of ammonia emissions, 
developing countries, with their high population and food 
requirements, dominate global emissions, producing about 
60% of agricultural and of total nitrous oxide emissions 
(Olivier et al., 1998). Even though emissions from nat-
ural processes, particularly microbiological processes in 
soils, greatly exceed anthropogenic emissions (3-8 Tg N 
versus 1-6 Tg N respectively), emissions of nitrous oxide 
are a good illustration of the impacts of a growing world 
population and of changing diets (towards higher meat 
consumption) on NOx emissions. These in turn require 
increased food output and changes in agricultural practices 
and technologies that result in increased emissions, even if 
the long-term history of ammonia and nitrous oxide emis-
sions remains to be researched. 
The literature on long-term nitrogen emissions scenarios 
is sparse. Due to the multitude of gas species and source 
categories, no scenarios exist that treat nitrogen emissions 
comprehensively. The most detailed projections available 
currently are those developed under the auspices of the 
IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Nakicen-
ovic et al., 2000), but even there, projections for ammonia 
emissions are lacking as the study focussed on (direct and 
indirect) greenhouse gases. Nonetheless, the study reflects 
current best knowledge on uncertainties in future nitrogen 
emission levels. By 2050, global nitrogen emissions could 
span a range of 45-1 IOMtN (N20 and NOx) and by 2100 
a range of 20-170 MtN (compared to 37 .6 MtN excluding 
NH3) in 1990 as estimated in Nakicenovic et al. (2000). 
Thus, over the long-term, nitrogen emissions could range 
between half of current to about four times current lev-
els indicating the large uncertainties in underlying driving 
forces such as population and economic growth, future 
developments in the agricultural, energy, and transport sec-
tors as well as in technology. 
Because of the multitude of gases and sources, nitro-
gen emission estimates are poorly understood and uncertain 
with the paucity in both past and present inventory data 
and future emission scenarios. More research is therefore 
needed before considering policy interventions to control 
these gases beyond well established source categories (e.g., 
nitrogen oxide emissions from automobiles, or nitrous 
oxide emissions from adipic acid production). See Nitro-
gen Cycle, Volume 2; Nitrogen Deposition on Forests, 
Volume 2. 
LINKING EMISSIONS TO DRIVING FORCES: 
THE CASE OF ENERGY-RELATED CARBON 
DIOXIDE 
Emissions are the result of a large set of interrelated driv-
ing variables in the domains of demographics, economics, 
resources and technology as well as (environmental) poli-
cies. Economic, social and technical systems and their 
interactions are highly complex and this short discussion 
cannot provide a comprehensive overview. 
Instead, the links from demography and the economy 
to resource use and emissions will be discussed in a sim-
plified format using proxy variables for various categories 
of driving forces . A frequently used analytical approach 
to describe these linkages is through the so called IPAT 
identity (Equation 1): 
Impact = population x affluence x technology (1) 
where environmental impacts (emissions) are the product 
of the level of population times the affluence (income 
per capita) times the level of technology deployed 
(emissions per unit of income) (see DPSIR (Driv-
ing Forces-Pressures-State-Impacts-Responses), Vol-
ume 4). The IPAT identity has been widely used in the 
analysis of energy related carbon dioxide emissions (for a 
review see Alcamo et al., 1995; Gaffin, 1998; and Naki-
cenovic et al., 2000) where it is generally referred to as the 
KAYA identity (Kaya, 1990) (Equation 2): 
Carbon dioxide emissions = population 
x (GDP/population) x (energy/GDP) 
x (carbon dioxide/energy) (2) 
In this extended IPAT identity, emissions are represented 
as the product of population times their level of affluence 
(gross domestic product (GDP)/capita), multiplied with 
two proxy variables for the level of technology, i.e., the 
efficiency of energy use per unit of GDP (Energy/GDP) 
as well as the carbon intensity of energy used (carbon 
dioxide/Energy). We classify these latter two variables as 
proxy variables for technology as they represent highly 
aggregated indicators that in addition also depend on many 
other factors, all related to income levels. These include 
the structure of the economy (e.g., industry versus service 
orientation), consumption patterns and the extent and nature 
of environmental policies. Energy price differences also 
matter, but are generally not related to differences in income 
levels. Frequently, the poor while unable to afford (high 
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priced) commercial energy forms such as electricity, rely 
on traditional fuels gathered largely outside the formal 
economy. Their costs however can be very high when 
considering the amount of time spent gathering fuelwood 
and environmental externalities such as high levels of 
indoor air pollution associated with burning of traditional 
fuels in open fire places (Smith, 1993). In tum, with 
rising incomes, consumer preferences shift to higher priced 
commercial energy forms (electricity, gas). Cleanliness and 
convenience of use afford a quality premium (willingness 
to pay higher prices), including higher energy efficiency 
and lower emissions (particulates, sulfur, carbon dioxide) 
per unit of energy. Thus, at the point of final energy use 
the energy and carbon intensity of the KAYA identity 
are related to income levels (affluence). This may not 
necessarily be visible in aggregated data, as the provision of 
clean energy forms at the point of consumption can entail 
efficiency losses and proportionately higher emissions at 
the point of energy production, e.g., when electricity is 
generated in traditional coal fired power stations. 
This multiplicative identity has the advantage that per-
centage growth rates of its components are additive, thus 
giving a first approximation of the scale of influence on 
emissions growth of different driving variables. However, 
despite the appeal of a simple representation, there are 
important caveats to bear in mind when using the above 
identity in interpreting past emissions trends (or future 
emission scenarios). The first is the issue of spatial het-
erogeneity. The second one is that it is not possible to treat 
the growth of individual components independently. 
For example, on face value, the KAYA and IPAT iden-
tities would suggest that carbon dioxide emissions scale 
linearly with population; that is, doubling the population 
means doubling the emissions. However, there are reasons 
to doubt such a simplified view. There is great hetero-
geneity among populations with respect to greenhouse gas 
emissions, so where the population increase takes place is 
not necessarily the same as where emissions increase. The 
ratio of per capita emissions of the world's richest coun-
tries to that of its poorest countries approaches ratios of 
several hundred (Gaffin, 1998). This problem requires one 
to consider spatially desegregated population growth. Of 
course, some level of aggregation is necessary for a global 
analysis. The biggest correction on emissions takes place 
when switching from a global to a breakdown of indus-
trialized (IND) versus developing (DEV) countries (Lutz, 
1993) (Table 3). 
The second caveat relates to the fact that it is not 
population per se that emits carbon dioxide, but the tech-
nologies that people employ and the goods and services 
they consume with their available income. This raises the 
issue about the relationship between demographics and eco-
nomic growth (between population and affluence in the 
IPAT identity) as well as between technology and affluence, 
which in tum would preclude consideration of a simple 
linear interpretation of the role of population growth in 
emissions. 
Demographic development interacts in many ways with 
social and economic development. Fertility and mortality 
trends depend, amongst other things, on education, income, 
Table 3 Major components (population, per capita income, energy and carbon intensities) for the increase 
of energy-related (gross) carbon emissions (Kaya Identity) and their average annual growth rates, 1800-2000, 
global (WOR) and regional totals" 
1800 1900 1950 1975 2000 1800-2000 
%/yr %/yr %/ yr %/yr %/yr 
POP IND 246 0.82 555 0.81 833 1.10 1096 0.77 1327 0.85 
million DEV 737 0.39 1083 0.88 1681 2.21 2901 2.00 4764 0.94 
WOR 983 0.51 1639 0.86 2514 1.87 3996 1.70 6091 0.92 
GDP/POP IND 675 1.26 2352 1.39 4686 3.35 10674 1.68 16188 1.60 
$/capita DEV 500 0.21 619 0.69 874 2.73 1715 2.28 3013 0.90 
WOR 544 0.80 1206 1.15 2137 2.71 4171 1.39 5883 1.20 
ENE/GDP IND 0.743 -0.40 0.497 -0.20 0.448 -0.33 0.413 -1.49 0.284 -0.48 
kgoe/$ DEV 0.450 -0. 17 0.379 -0.01 0.377 -0.54 0.329 -0.48 0.292 -0.22 
WOR 0.541 -0. 17 0.457 -0.13 0.429 -0.40 0.388 -1.20 0.287 -0.32 
C/ENE IND 1.238 -0.12 1.103 -0.33 0.937 -0.64 0.798 -0.66 0.676 -0.30 
kg C/kgoe DEV 1.252 0.00 1.249 -0.23 1.112 -0.36 1.017 -0.40 0.921 -0.15 
WOR 1.246 -0.09 1.144 -0.31 0.979 -0.55 0.853 -0.38 0.776 -0.24 
Carbon IND 152 1.56 715 1.67 1638 3.48 3851 0.27 4123 1.66 
Tg C DEV 208 0.43 318 1.33 616 4.05 1664 3.42 3858 1.47 
WOR 360 1.06 1033 1.57 2254 3.64 5516 1.49 7980 1.56 
• The two regions are defined in the UNFCCC, including Annex-I countries (IND, for industrialized countries) and non-
Annex-1 countries (DEV, for developing countries). For units, see table. Estimates of energy use, energy intensities, and 
(gross) carbon emissions include non-commercial, traditional biofuels which are particularly uncertain. 
Source: Updated (see text) from Grubler and Nakicenovic (1994) and Nakicenovic and Grubler (2000) . 
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social norms and health provisions. In turn, they determine 
the size and age composition of the population. All fac-
tors combined are recognized as important in explaining 
long-run productivity and economic growth and technolog-
ical change as well (Barro, 1997). In turn, long-run per 
capita economic growth is closely linked with advances 
in knowledge and technological change. In fact, analysis 
of long-run macroeconomic growth accounts (e.g., Solow, 
1956; Denison, 1962, 1985; Maddison, 1995; Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin, 1995) confirm that advances in knowledge 
and technology form the single largest source for long-
run economic growth, more important than growth in other 
factors of production like capital and labor. Abramovitz 
(1993) demonstrates that capital and labor productivity can-
not be treated as independent from technological change. 
In terms of the IPAT identity, it is thus not possible to 
treat the affluence and technology variables as indepen-
dent from each other either. In addition, pollution abate-
ment efforts appear to increase with income, a relationship 
often referred to as the environmental Kuznets curve that 
seems well established for traditional pollutants such as par-
ticulates and sulfur (e.g., World Bank, 1992) but which 
has not been demonstrated for aggregate greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Technological, economic and social innovations have 
long been means by which a greater number of people 
could live from the same environmental resources. The best 
known historical examples of major periods of innovation 
include the Neolithic revolution (beginnings of organized 
agriculture from around 10 000 years ago); and the Indus-
trial Revolution beginning two centuries ago (Rosenberg 
and Birsdzell, 1996). In each case, changes in patterns 
of primary production (food, energy, materials), the effi-
ciency of resources use, as well as changes in environmental 
impacts have been linked to changes in social organization, 
institutions, economy and technology (Mumford, 1934; 
Landes, 1969; Mokyr, 1990). No one of these changes can 
be considered to be the primary driver, nor as independent 
from the others: each played a role in an interconnected 
system. 
Before the Neolithic revolution, the world population 
amounted to perhaps 5-10 million. Over the following mil-
lennia complex societies developed based around cities, 
with highly differentiated social roles and complex polit-
ical, economic and legal systems. By the birth of the 
current major religions 1500-2500 years ago, world pop-
ulation had increased to around 300 million. Following a 
period of cultural, economic and technical stagnation to 
about I 000 AD with notable exceptions in China and the 
Islamic world (Mokyr, 1990), further population growth 
began with the productivity increases resulting from cul-
tural, economic and technological developments associated 
with the European Renaissance. By the time of Thomas 
Malthus in the late 18th century, the global population 
had reached about one billion. The six-fold increase in 
global population over the following 200 years has been 
enabled by a continuing revolution in medical, agricultural 
and industrial technology. However, the most remarkable 
change in recent decades has been the so-called demo-
graphic transition, as people increasingly manage their own 
rate of reproduction, leading to a decline in population 
growth rates (see Table 3) or to a stabilization of popu-
lation size in many parts of the world (see Population 
Sizes, Changes, Volume 2; Demographic Change: the 
Aging Population, Volume 3; Global Population Trends, 
Volume 3; Urban Population Change, Volume 3; Demo-
graphic transition, Volume 5). 
This transition has typically been linked to improved 
education, female empowerment, access to information, 
improved medical services (and related reductions in infant 
mortality) and social and economic development facili-
tated by the international diffusion of new technologies. 
Therefore, it is not possible to treat changes in demo-
graphics, income, and technology as independent from each 
other. 
With the above caveats in mind, let us consider the quan-
titative evidence since the onset of the Industrial Revolution 
(ca. 1800), cast in terms of the KAYA identity. 
Table 3 summarizes the growth of population, per capita 
income, energy use per unit economic activity and energy 
related (gross) carbon emissions per unit energy used since 
1800. The estimated indicators represent a revised updated 
data set based on Griibler (l 998a); Griibler and Nakicen-
ovic (1994) and Nakicenovic and Griibler (2000). Data 
with a finer temporal and spatial resolution are available 
from the author upon request. Because the energy use data 
include the historically important non-commercial uses of 
traditional biofuels, the resulting energy use and energy 
intensities (energy use per unit of GDP) estimates are 
subject to a high degree of uncertainty; the values given 
here represent a conservative lower bound estimate and 
are subject to further research and revision. Total energy 
use in the 19th century industrialized countries and in 
developing countries prior to 1975 (see the discussion in 
Nakicenovic et al., 1998) are thus likely to be underesti-
mated. Resulting historical improvements in energy inten-
sities (including all energy forms) may consequently also 
be significantly underestimated. For instance the aggre-
gate improvements in energy intensity of 0.5% year-I since 
1800 for the industrialized countries (including Eastern 
Europe and Russia) given in Table 3, need to be contrasted 
with estimates for individual countries with good histor-
ical records that indicate long-term improvement rates of 
about I% year-I since the 19th century (Nakicenovic, 1984; 
Martin, 1988; Griibler, 1991) and much higher rates since 
the early 1970s (reflected in Table 3). Non-commercial 
energy use and resulting energy intensity improvement 
rates for developing countries prior to 1975 are particularly 
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uncertain, possibly underestimated by up to a factor of 
three. 
In order to simplify, only two macro-regions (industrial-
ized versus developing countries) and trends between five 
major dates are shown. Interspersed between the main his-
torical dates, the respective annual growth rates of these 
indicators calculated over their respective time periods 
are shown in italics. Total period (1800-2000) growth 
rates are presented in bold (most far right column in 
Table 3). As mentioned above, the relative magnitude of 
the growth rates and how they sum up to explain the 
growth rates in energy related carbon dioxide emissions 
are indicative only as they do not capture the interdepen-
dence among variables; notably between technology and 
economic growth on the one hand and demographics on 
the other. 
A first observation on Table 3 is that there is no uniform, 
unambiguous answer about what (proxy) driving force dom-
inates in explaining historical emissions growth. Compo-
nent growth rates are highly variable across regions and 
over time. On the positive (i.e., emission increasing) side of 
the KAYA identity are population growth and increases in 
per capita incomes, on the negative (emission decreasing) 
side of the identity are improvements in energy intensity 
(energy use per unit of GDP) as well as decreases in the 
ratio of (gross) carbon emissions per unit energy used, a 
trend termed frequently as decarbonization (Griibler, 1991 ; 
Nakicenovic, 1993 ). 
Demographic and economic development tend to increase 
emissions, a trend partly compensated by improvements 
in the two proxy variables representing technology. Glob-
ally, an average increase of 1.6% year- 1 in (gross) energy 
related carbon emissions since 1800 can be decomposed 
into roughly equal contributions from population and per 
capita income growth (average 2. lo/oyear- 1) to be con-
trasted against an about equal contribution from improve-
ments in technology (energy intensity improvements and 
decarbonization) of jointly -0.5% year- 1• However, these 
numbers vary enormously depending on which time period 
is being considered, as well as across regions. 
As discussed above, the component variables of the 
KAYA identity are not independent from each other. For 
instance, the influence of technological change goes far 
beyond the numbers captured in the percentage rates of 
change of the energy intensity and decarbonization vari-
ables presented in Table 3; this is because technological 
change is also the main source for productivity growth 
and hence increases in per capita incomes. This illustrates 
the paradox of technological development (Gray, 1989), 
where technology is both the source as well as the (par-
tial) remedy of the historical increases in environmental 
burdens. Prometheus unbound (Landes, 1969) has released 
the powers of technology that helped humans to expand in 
numbers at ever higher levels of affluence, thus increasingly 
burdening the global commons. But technological change 
has also helped to reduce (part of) these environmen-
tal burdens by improved efficiency in the use of energy 
and the carbon atom. More research is needed to answer 
the question, if and how fast the paradox of technolog-
ical development may be resolved in the future, tilting 
the balance of the equation towards stabilizing emissions, 
even their long-term decline. The challenge becomes com-
pounded by the inevitable demographic momentum (the 
mothers of the future are already born today) that makes 
in increase of global population to some 8 billion almost a 
certainty (Lutz et al., 1997). There is also a need for con-
tinued social and economic development for the larger part 
of the global population still excluded from the benefits of 
the use of modern technology. 
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